Tommy Andersson
Professor
Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application
Författare
Summary, in English
This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2017
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Papers,
Issue
2017:16
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Förlag
Department of Economics, Lund University
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- forced migration
- asylum seekers
- refugee assignment
- matching
- market design
- C78
- F22
Status
Published