Tommy Andersson
Professor
An Algorithm for Identifying Least Manipulable Envy-Free and Budget-Balanced Allocations in Economies with Indivisibilities
Författare
Summary, in English
We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent-k-linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2021
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Papers
Issue
2021:2
Fulltext
- Available as PDF - 271 kB
- Download statistics
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Envy-freeness
- Budget-balance
- Least manipulable
- Algorithm
- C71
- C78
- D63
- D71
- D78
Status
Published