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Porträtt av Tommy Andersson. Foto.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Porträtt av Tommy Andersson. Foto.

Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach

Författare

  • Tommy Andersson
  • Lars Ehlers
  • Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Summary, in English

This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one that he currently is possessing, or continue renting the house he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants. We also argue that the theoretical model represents an extension and an improvement of the U.K. Housing Act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer the ownership of the houses to the existing tenants.

Avdelning/ar

  • Nationalekonomiska institutionen

Publiceringsår

2015

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University

Issue

12

Dokumenttyp

Working paper

Förlag

Department of Economics, Lund University

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • Existing tenants
  • equilibrium
  • minimum equilibrium prices
  • maximum trade
  • group non-manipulability
  • dynamic price process

Status

Published