Tommy Andersson
Professor
An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
Författare
Summary, in English
We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2022
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
50-60
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
International Journal of Economic Theory
Volym
18
Issue
1
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Wiley-Blackwell
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- algorithm
- budget-balance
- envy-freeness
- least manipulable
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 1742-7355