Tommy Andersson
Professor
Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such markets, the existence of a unique minimum rationing equilibrium price vector has been established for each preference profile on a general preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. This vector can be used as a key ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism. The main contribution of this paper is to provide two price sequences, one with increasing prices and one with decreasing prices, that both terminate to a minimal rationing equilibrium price vector in a finite number of steps. These sequences are demonstrated to play key-roles in an English auction and a Dutch auction, respectively, for the considered housing market with price restrictions.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2015
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Issue
18
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Förlag
Department of Economics, Lund University
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Price sequence
- auction rules
- rationing
- rationing equilibrium price
Status
Published