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Tommy Andersson
Professor
![Porträtt av Tommy Andersson. Foto.](/sites/ehl.lu.se/files/styles/lu_personal_page_desktop/public/2024-01/TommyAndersson2016_01.jpg.webp?itok=24g5oCFT)
Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2006
Språk
Engelska
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Issue
11
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Working paper
Förlag
Department of Economics, Lund University
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Indivisible objects
- fairness
- coalitionally strat
Aktiv
Published