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Porträtt av Tommy Andersson. Foto.

Tommy Andersson

Professor

Porträtt av Tommy Andersson. Foto.

Refugee Matching as a Market Design Application

Författare

  • Tommy Andersson

Summary, in English

This note contains a few brief remarks on the similarities and differences between some standard market design applications (e.g., kidney exchange and school choice) and the refugee assignment problem. The main conclusion is that the refugee assignment problem is more complex in some dimensions than many of the standard market design applications. Consequently, classical mechanisms cannot be used to solve the problem and more research is needed to, e.g., understand how to model preferences, and how to define relevant axioms and multidimensional constraints.

Avdelning/ar

  • Nationalekonomiska institutionen

Publiceringsår

2017

Språk

Engelska

Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie

Working Papers,

Issue

2017:16

Dokumenttyp

Working paper

Förlag

Department of Economics, Lund University

Ämne

  • Economics

Nyckelord

  • forced migration
  • asylum seekers
  • refugee assignment
  • matching
  • market design
  • C78
  • F22

Status

Published