Tommy Andersson
Professor
Strategy-proof allocation of objects : A characterization result
Författare
Summary, in English
This paper considers an allocation problem with a finite number of objects and unit-demand agents. The main result is a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms on a general domain where preferences over pairs of objects and houses are rational, monotonic, and continuous. A mechanism belongs to this class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given this restriction, that the mechanism selects minimal equilibrium prices.
Avdelning/ar
- Nationalekonomiska institutionen
Publiceringsår
2024-03
Språk
Engelska
Sidor
1-5
Publikation/Tidskrift/Serie
Mathematical Social Sciences
Volym
128
Länkar
Dokumenttyp
Artikel i tidskrift
Förlag
Elsevier
Ämne
- Economics
Nyckelord
- Characterization
- House allocation
- Multi-object auction
- Strategy-proofness
Status
Published
ISBN/ISSN/Övrigt
- ISSN: 0165-4896